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ISSUES ON REPLY

I. DOES THE OBJECTIVE MEANING OF "COMMISSION" INCLUDE PROFIT
SHARING OR CONTINGENT COMMISSIONS"!
II. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THE CONTRACT WAS
AMBIGUOUS?

Ill. DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THE ··OTHER FUNCTIONS''
LANGUAGE INCLUDED PROFIT SHARING?
IV. IS THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT GEM STATE PROFIT SHARING
PAYMENTS ARE DISTINCTIVE FROM ACUITY, ALLIANCE OR ALLIED
IRRATIONAL AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD?
V. SHOULD THE DISTRICT COURT HA VE CONSTRUED THE CONTRACT AGAINST
THE DRAFfER?
VI. DID THE .JUDGMENT BELOW, AS WRITTEN, FAIL TO INCLUDE THAT KUNZ
PREVAILED AT LEAST IN PART ON THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT?
VII. WAS THE TRIAL COURT OBLIGATED TO DISMISS THE MATTER UNDER
I.R.C.P. RULE 4Hb)?
VIII. ARE APPELLANTS ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
RESPONDENT NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES?

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

I. THE OBJECTIVE MEANING OF "COMMISSION" INCLUDE PROFIT SHARING OR
CONTINGENT COMMISSIONS.
Nield, Inc. argues that, "The objective law of contract is a law of contract interpretation that
mandates that a court is to give force and effect to the objective meaning of the words used in the
contract, without considering what a party thought the language meant or what a party actually
intended for the terms to mean," citing to J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 167 P.3d 748
(2006). Resp. Brief, p. 7. Without considering any of the parties' subjective evidence, the word
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"commission" means, "Recompense, compensation, reward of an agent, salesman, executor, trustee,
receiver, factor, broker, or bailiff when same is calculated as a percentage on the amount of his
transaction or the profit to the princjpal." Black's Law Dictionary, Yh Edition; see also, Winer v.

Sales, 217 Maryland 123, 141 A.2d 749, 750. (Cited at R. 445.) On its face, therefor, the word
"commission" would include all profits however derived, whether by direct commission, contingent
commission, profit sharing, bonuses, or otherwise, so long as it was predicated upon Bret Kunz'
transaction. Nield, Inc.'s position is the subjective one, not the objective one. Only Nield, Inc. tries
to impose an interpretation of "commission" that is inconsistent with common parlance, and use the
most restrictive interpretation conceivable under the word.
Nield, Inc. assumes, without any foundation or evidence whatsoever, that if the contract is
not ambiguous they should prevail on their interpretation of "commission". The Trial Court did find
the term is ambiguous, but Kunz maintains that on its face there is no basis to exclude contingent
commissions within the scope of the word "commission". Nield, Inc. provides no definition of that
word that precludes profit sharing or contingent commissions. Moreover, the contract reads, "Agent
will receive 80 percent of commissions received on insurance placed by Agent with Company.
Company will receive 20 percent of commissions placed by Agent with Company." In fact,
however, Nield, Inc. has been receiving more than 20 percent of the commissions generated by Bret
Kunz, and Bret Kunz has been receiving less than 80 percent of the commissions received because
Nield, Inc. arbitrarily chose to exclude contingent commissions and profit sharing payments that
were in fact received on insurance placed by Agent Bret Kunz with Nield, Inc. A fortiori the
objective reading of the contract is in favor of Appellant Bret Kunz and against Respondent Nield,
Inc. because otherwise the math doesn't work out. Had the contract read only 80 percent to the agent,
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and was silent about what the company would receive from insurance placed by the agent, Nield,
lnc.'s position would be more viable. Here, however, there is no dispute that the profit sharing or
contingent commission payments are, in fact, received by Nield, Inc., and they predicated in part (or
in whole) by the insurance business placed by Bret Kunz. Unless those payments are included within
the 80/20 split, the literal words of the contract are accorded no real meaning or effect.
Historically, Nield, Inc. has been receiving more than 20 percent of the commissions because
they have taken profit sharing and contingent commission payments as well as premium payments.
While Bret has received contingent commissions from Gem State, he has received only 50 percent
of those, and a small fraction of profit sharing payments on Acuity and Alliance. Kunz should be
receiving 80 percent according to the literal wording of the contract, and Nield, Inc. should not be

receiving more than 20 percent.
The District Court in this case found that the term "commission" was ambiguous, and
reasonably capable of more than one meaning, with which Appellant agrees if the reader focuses
only on the word "commission" and ignores the context of the whole sentence. However, when one
adds in the 80/20 split language specifying that which each of the party is to receive, one cannot
mathematically honor the 80 percent and 20 percent split without including profit sharing and
contingent commission and still have the meaning of those words remain viable. Furthermore, one
cannot split the Gem State profit sharing commissions 50/50 and still end up with Bret Kunz exactly
80 percent of the overall commissions and Nield, Inc. receiving 20 percent of the overall
commissions, because despite how infinitesimal profit sharing is to the totality of the commissions
received in an annual year, it still alters the math. In other words, unless one includes profit sharing
au<l wntingent commissions on an 80/20 basis, Nield, Inc. ends up with more than 20 percent and
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - Page 3

Bret Kunz ends up with less than 80 percent of the commissions received. There's no denying that.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THE CONTRACT WAS

AMBIGUOUS.
Nield, Inc. states in its Brief that the "Kunzes fail to cite anything in the record that shows
the District Court found the Agent Contract unambiguous but gave meaning to Nield, Inc. 's
"subjective intent" of contract terms anyway." Resp. Brief, p. 9. The District Court correctly
observed that there was no merger dause with respect to this particular contract and that the contract
was not integrated. The Court found that both the last sentence of Paragraph 6 (the "other functions"
language) and the word "commission" in Paragraph 7 was ambiguous, justifying admission of
extrinsic evidence to try to arrive at the parties' intent.' It is absolutely correct that the District Court
found the Agent Contract ambiguous. The fact that the contract was, at least, ambiguous was one
predicate upon which Kunz' suit was premised and upon which all of the extrinsic evidence was
admitted. Kunz whole heartedly concedes that he did not prove the contract was unambiguous
because even if the reader concurs with Kunz' interpretation of the word "commission", the "other
functions" language is unquestionably patently ambiguous. Respondent's own expert witness,
Stephen Ahl, testified that contingent commissions or profit sharing payments may, or may not, be
paid to subagents or producers who work for an agent. T. Vol. IT, p. 358, LL. 24-25, p. 59, LL. 1-15.
This supports the fact that they word "commission" can be reasonably interpreted in more than one
way.
Nield, Inc. argues that, "Relevant inquiry in determining whether a contract is ambiguous is

1

As argued previously, the word "commission" is ambiguous on its fact, but in the
context of the 80/20 split language Kunz believes it must be construed objectively to include
profit sharing or contingent commissions payments received by Nield, Inc.
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the meaning intended by the parties at the time of contracting, not at some future time," citing

Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308,315,246 P.3d 961,968 (2010). Resp.
Brief p. 22. Appellants agree. The issue of profit sharing was raised by Bryan Nield at the very time
of the signing of the contract. R. 519. See also, footnote 24 of the Court's Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law. Prior to the signing of the subject contract, Bret Kunz had never received any
profit sharing or bonus checks under his 1996 contract, because he was a subproducer under Michael
Kunz. Tr. Vol. I, p. 138, LL. 4-19; p. 27, LL. 14-19.
Nield, Inc. 's position is that Bret Kunz is not entitled to any profit sharing or contingent
commission payments under the 2009 contract. However, they can come up with no justification to
explain why, after executing the 2009 contract in the Fall of 2008, Bret instantly started receiving
profit sharing payments, first on the Gem State insurance business, then later on Acuity and AJliance,
as well. Each of those profit sharing payments was paid by Nield, Inc. to Bret and specifically labeled
as profit sharing payments,2 although Bret only received 50 percent on Gem State and, it turns out
after this lawsuit was filed and Bret obtained some accounting from the insurance companies, he
received an arbitrary and uneven amount with respect to the other companies which does not
correlate with the amount received by Nield, Inc. The District Court was obviously at a loss to
explain these payments, as well, and specifically stated:3
The Court recognizes that these claims by B.Kunz concerning statements made by

2

Ex.'s 106,107,108, 111.

3

Although these two footnotes, 24 and 28, are found within the Conclusions of Law
portion of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the District Court, there can be no
dispute but that they are actually findings of fact, because the Court is specifically weighing the
credibility of witnesses, one over another, therein. A~ such, these are properly findings of fact,
not conclusions of law.
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B.Nield are disputed and that B.Nield denies making said statements. However, the
Court has determined that B.Kunz' testimony is more credible and reliable on these
points and accepts his testimony as being accurate and truthful on these points. There
are a number of reasons for the Court' s determination on this point, chief among
them being that long before the litigation was filed or even contemplated by these
parties, B.Nield and N.I. freely used the term profit sharing in dealing with B.Kunz
with respect to Gem State Insurance, Acuity and Farmers Alliance. Not only was this
term used on check receipts (B.Nield teslifieu lhal the phrase profit sharing was used
on some documents generated by N.I., because of its accounting software). See Tr.
Ex. 111, p. 2, it was also freely used in B.Nield's Memo's to B.Kunz. See Tr. Ex. ' s
106, 107, and 109. Never once, prior to this litigation. did B.Nield dispute, correct
or suggest to B.Kunz that profit sharing was not part of their relationship and that
B.Kunz was off base in his understanding that there was profit sharing. It is
inconceivable to this Court. that a business, such as N.I., and/or a principal in said
business, such as B.Nield, would allow a partner or colleague such as B.Kunz to
continue uncorrected when it was so clear that he believed that he was entitled to
profit sharing. The dialogue was never about whether profit sharing existed, but the
amount of the split.See Tr. Ex.'s 108,109, and 110. R. 519, fn. 24. [emphasis added]
The Court's use of the term "unfortunately" is not suggestive of this Court harboring
a prejudice or bias in favor of Kunz. Rather it is suggestive of the Court's conclusion
that it believes B.Kunz' testimony in many respects regarding the verbal statements
made by B.Nield concerning profit sharing, specifically as it relates to Findings of
Fact Nos. 17 and 19. Just as the Court addressed in F. No. 24, the Court has
determined that B.Kunz' testimony is more credible and reliable on these points and
accepts his testimony as being accurate and truthful on these points. There are a
number of reasons for the Court's determination on this point, chief among them
being that long before the litigation was filed or even contemplated by these parties,
B.Nield and N.I. freely used the term profit sharing in dealing with B.Kunz with
respect to Gem State Insurance, Acuity, and Farmer's Alliance. Not only was this
term used on check receipts (B.Nield testified that the phrase profit sharing was used
on some of documents generated by N.I. 's because of its accounting software), (See
Tr. Ex. 111 P.2); it was also freely used in B.Nield's memo's to B.Kunz. See Tr.
Ex. 's 106, 107, 109. Never once, prior to this litigation, did B.Nield dispute, correct
or suggest to B.Kunz that profit sharing was not a part of their relationship and that
he was off base in his understanding that there was profit sharing. It is inconceivable
to this Court that a business such as N.I., and/or a principal in said business, such as
B. Nield, would allow a business partner or colleague, such as B.Kunz, to continue
uncorrected when it was so clear that he believed he was entitled to profit sharing
from all insurance companies in the amount of 80/20 split. It is also curious to the
Court that the profit sharing was paid in odd amounts, suggestive of the application
of some type of formula (B.Kunz argued this is indicative of an intent to deceive
B.Kunz into believing he was receiving a profit sharing check pursuant to a 50/50
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split or 80/20 split). Although the Court declines to make such a finding, any time
in this Court's experience that it has been a recipient of a gratuitous bonus from an
employer or as an employer providing an employee with a gratuitous bonus, it has
been a rounded number, for example $500.00 or $1,500.00, not once has it been in
an odd amount such as $663.50, $629.00 or $420.00. R.524, Fn. 28
Unexplainably, the Court nevertheless ruled:
However, once again the Court cannot find that an agreement exists outside the four
corners of the parties' "Agent Contract" whereby N.I. contractually agreed to pay
B.Kunz a 50/50 split, an 80/20 split, or for that matter any amount of a split
associated with contingent business paid from Acuity, Alliance, and Allied. Rather,
it appears to this Court that N.f. 's payment or bonuses, characterized as "profit
sharing", to B.Kunz was a purely arbitrary and gratuitous act on N.l.'s part. R. 52425.
This legal conclusion is completely incongruent with the findings of facts made above. The
only scintilla of evidence in the record that would support such a conclusion, i.e. that the payments
on Acuity, Alliance and Allied labeled by Nield, Inc. as "profit sharing" were supposedly "gratuitous
bonuses" is the testimony of Bryan Nield, and there is no other basis upon which such a conclusion
could be predicated.
The Court attempted to explain Nield Inc.' s payment ofprofit sharing payments as an implied
contract outside the written agreement between the parties to justify the Court not using the parties'
course of dealing as evidence of their contractual intent, which was the only reason evidence was
admitted. The Court specifically made the parties stipulate at the onset of trial that said the course
of performance testimony was not for the purpose of an implied contract theory. In this regard, and
ironically, Bret Kunz and Nield, Inc. are in agreement that the Court erred.4

4

Nield, Inc. might want to rethink its position in this regard because when you properly
remove the implied contract theory the judge is left with nothing to justify the stream of
payments made from Nield, Inc. to Bret Kunz which they specificaJJy labeled as profit sharing
and which commenced shortly after the signing of the subject contract and continued throughout
the term of the 2009 contract.
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Appe11ants concur that the first step in the contract interpretation analysis is to attempt to
derive the parties' intent. Here the testimony is clear that Bret Kunz' intent was to have the same
contract that his predecessor Michael Kunz had, and upon which Bret Kunz believed Michael was
getting profit sharing as a co-owner of the Book of Business.
Nield, Inc.' s intent, stated at the time of the signing, seems to support this, but if it does not,
what is clear is that Bryan Nield's intent was not to give Bret Kunz the same contract that Michael
5

had because he changed the wording to attempt to include Life and Health business, as well. This
change in wording was made after Bret and Marti had reviewed the draft version, Ex. 103, but prior
to signing the actual contract, Ex. 104, 105. ln retrospect, it appears these parties did not have a
subjective meeting of the minds. Nevertheless, they had an objective contract because both parties
signed it, whether or not they carefully read it or not. It is undisputed that it was entirely drafted by
Nield, Inc. agents. What the Court should have done was (1) rule that the term "commission"
encompasses profit sharing or contingent commissions on its face, or (2) when utilized in the context
of the 80/20 split language, profit sharing payments must be included to give integrity to the math,
or (3) that the language is so ambiguous that extrinsic evidence should be considered as to the
parties' intent, and that by use of the word "profit sharing" on the Gem State, Acuity and Alliance
payments and in the memos between the parties, combined with the discussion about profit sharing
at the time of the signing of the contract manifests a mutual subjective intent of the parties to pay
profit sharing payments under the 2009 contract, or (4) if it does not so manifest, then there was no
subjective meeting of the minds on the issue and the Court should have applied the tailback position

5

Curnpare lht: tlrnfl version, 11'11 5 and the first 8 of Ex. 103, with Ex. 105, ,r,r 5 and the first
8. R. Pp. 11, 12, 15, 16.
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and construed the language against the drafter.
Instead, the Court erred in ignoring the extrinsic course of dealing of the parties as a
manifestation of the parties' intent, and instead applying an implied contract theory which was
precluded at the onset of trial. As such, both parties are prejudiced because they did not argue or
present their case in such a light or possibility. Ironically, the Court's Findings of Fact favor Kunz,
but its Conclusions of Law are nun sequitur.

III. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THE "OTHER FUNCTIONS"
LANGUAGE INCLUDED PROFIT SHARING.
In Issue ill of Respondent's Brief, Nield, Inc. states:
The District Court concluded that it could not find the contract "intended to
set out terms and conditions associated with profit sharing or contingent commissions
associated with Acuity, Alliance or Allied. R. 524, ,i 39. This finding shows that the
Court considered the contract, including Paragraph 7, but could not find any
contractual duty for profit sharing. Browning v. Ringel, 134 ldaho 6, 10-11, 995 P.2d
35, 355-56 (2000) (The findings of the trial court will be liberally construed to
support a judgment order, consequently, if facts can be inferred from those findings,
such inferences will be deemed to have been drawn.) Resp. Brief, p. 16.

Paragraph 39 at R. 524 of the District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is
not a finding of fact, but a conclus ion of law. It is labeled by the District Court as a conclusion of
law, and although the Court uses the word "find" it is clearly a conclusion premised upon the
findings the Court did make. While the Court is concluding that it cannot find the parties intended
to include Acuity, Alliance and Allied profit sharing to be included within their Agent Contract,
nowhere in the findings did the Court conclude that the parties did not intend to include profit
sharing in their Agent Contract. In other words, the fair inference from the fact is that there wasn·t
a subjective meeting of the minds on this issue, assuming the District Court was correct in not
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utilizing the course of dealing conduct and language to derive the parties' intent.
Browning recognized the proper standard of appellate review:
When an action is tried to a court without a jury, appellate review is limited
to ascertaining whether the court's findings of fact are supported by substantial and
competent evidence. See The Highlands, Inc. v. Hosac, 130 Idaho 67, 69, 936 P.2d
1309, 1311 (1987); Kootenai El~c. Co-Op v. Washington Water Power Co., 127
Idaho 432, 434, 901 P.2d 1333, 1335 (1995). Findings which are supported by
substantial and competent evidence will not be set aside on appeal even though the
evidence may be conflicting. See The Highlands~ Inc., 130 Idaho at 69, 936 P.2d at
1311. The trial court's findings of fact will be liberally construed in favor of the
judgment entered. See Id. "The credibility and weight to be given to the evidence is
in the province of the trial judge as the trier of fact, and the findings made by the trial
judge will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." Id. This Court has free review
over the trial court's conclusions oflaw and may draw its own legal conclusions from
the facts presented. See Id. [emphasis added] Browning, supra at 134 Idaho 10-11,
955 P.2d 355-56.
The facts, as found by the Trial Court in weighing credibility of witnesses were in favor of
Appellant Kunz, but the Trial Court's conclusions were not. This appeal is predicated on the basis
that the conclusions do not flow from the facts found and that the lower Court mis-applied the law
in critical aspects. First, the Trial Court did not consider the course of conduct of the parties as
indicia of their intent in interpreting the Agent Contract. The District Court clearly found that Bret
Kunz was being paid payments labeled as profit sharing on Gem State, Acuity and AJ Iiance, and that
the payments first commenced after signing the subject Agent Contract. Rather than properly apply
the course of dealing evidence, the Court went off on a search for impl ied contracts, a matter not
properly before it (as the Respondent itself agrees). While there are some things you can't infer from
the finding of a fact, you can't always fairly infer the opposite from a non-finding of a fact. For
example, in this case the Court concluded that it could not find the parties intended Acuity and
Alliance profit sharing payments to be included within the Agent Contract. Does that necessarily
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mean that the Court found the parties did not intend the Acuity and Alliance profit s haring to be
within the purv iew of the Agent Contract? The answer is no because there's a third p ossibility, i.e.
that the parties didn' t have a manifest meetings of the minds o n this particular issue, and that is why
we have the doctrine of construing a written contract against the drafter (the fallback position).
Were it not so, the fallback position, i.e. the long-held doctrine of constructio n against the
drafter would never apply to any contract. Respondent misunderstands basic logic. If you find a horse
is not black that does not mean necessarily the horse is white, as horses may be other colors. The
same applies to contract interpretation. A finding that the parties intended X precludes Y, but a non
finding that the parties intended X does not. Had the Court concluded that the parties' subjective
intent was to include profit sharing payments within the Agent Contract that would necessarily
preclude a factual finding that the parties intended to have a side agreement based on their course
of dealings. The opposite, however, is not logically mandated, that a conclusion of no subjective
intent to include profit sharing precludes a side agreement. Nor does it preclude the possibility that
the parties simply did not have a s ubjective meeting of the minds on this particular issue, and that
the contract must be construed not predicated on the parties' subjective intent but on the objective
words that they used.
In other words, Appellants maintain first that the Court's conclusion that the Agent Contract
does not include profit sharing is an error of Law because it does not flow from the course of dealings
facts and the credibility of witness weighing done by the Court below; secondly, that the diversion
into implied contract analysis was an error of law because such a theory was no t before the Court'
and third, and perhaps most importantly, is that the Trial Court fa iled to observe and apply the
doctrine of construction against the drafter because the Trial Court, like Respondent, didn't
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recognize that it is possible for parties to not have a subjective meeting of the minds on every issue
of a written contract and still be bound by the words they have used.
Furthermore, use of the words "other functions" based on commission split must be
construed against the drafter and in favor of Bret Kunz. Absent that, as noted in Appellants' opening
brief, these words have no meaning. The 1996 Agent Contract with Bret Kunz (Ex. 103, R. 11-13)
and the draft of the subject 2009 Contract provided in relevant part:
Company wil1 maintain contracts with companies for placing of insurance.
Company will do all billing and accounting functions (except collections). Agent is
personally responsible for collection of premiums and returned commission on
business placed. Company will provide Agent with a commissioned earned statement
and commission check based on agreed percentages on the 151h of each month. Other
ftmctions based on commission ::,,plit and individual agreement. The Company will
1
provide to the Agent a 1099 Form showing annual earnings by the 30 h of January of
the following year.6 /emphasis added] R. 12.
The Court construed that because commission checks were being paid monthly the parties
must not have intended profit sharing to be paid under the Agent Contract because profit sharing is
paid annually. This construction would not only take away profit sharing from Agent Bret Kunz, but
any insurance payment that was paid quarterly, semi-annually or annually. The fact that Bret Kunz
receives his checks from Nield, Inc. on a monthly basis does not mean he only gets paid insurance
commissions which are paid monthly by customers. In the course of business he may receive a
commission an annual payment by various customers every month of the year, because property and
casualty insurance is often paid annually or semi-annually (such as homeowner's insurance, and

6

The actual 2009 Agent Contract signed by the parties was slightly modified, referenced
to the 1099 Form was moved in the Paragraph, the 301h day of January language was deleted, and
the language regarding when the earned statement and commission check would be paid is overtyped on the Nield, Inc. letterhead, such that it is illegible. The "other functions" language ends
up being the last sentence of Paragraph 6 of the Agent Contract.
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those automobile policies where the customer chooses lo pay annually rather than monthly). This
Supreme Court is as in good a position lo construe the "other functions'' language as the District
Court, after giving full consideration the District Co urt' s factual findings.
Those findings did not preclude the "other functions" language from applying to profit
sharing payments. In fact, the District Court failed to explain when that language would ever apply.

If it doesn't apply to profit sharing or contingent commissions, when does il apply? It can't apply to
commissions covered by Paragraph 7 of the Agent Contract because then it would be surplusage. The
only way to honor the doctrine that "[i]n construing a contract an interpretation should be avoided
that would render meaningless any particular provision in the contract." Star Phoenix Mining Co.

v. Hecla Mining Co., 130 Idaho 223, 233, 939 P.2d 542, 552 (1997) (citing to Top of the Track

Assoc. v. Lewiston Raceways, Inc., 654 A.2d 1293, 1296 (Me. 1995); Wyoming Game & Fish
Comm 'n v. Mills Co., 701 P.2d 819 (Wyo. 1985) in this case is to construe the "other function"
language as applying to profit sharing or contingent commissions. Anything else renders the
language the parties used in their written contract meaningless.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT GEM STATE PROFIT SHARING
PAYMENTS ARE DISTINCTIVE FROM ACUITY, ALLIANCE OR ALLIED IS
IRRATIONAL AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
The Respondent noted correctly that the Court below erred as a matter of law in including
implied contract theory into its analysis in this case and the Appellants agree. Respondent argues that
said inclusion is harmless error and Appellants disagree. The Trial Court used implied contract
theory as a means to explain away the course of dealings facts duly found , and well supported by the
record, and then found itself with the arduous task of attempting to distinguish Gem State from the
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other insurance carriers. This is a distinction without substance.
As noted in Appellants' Opening Brief:
All three companies are property and casualty companies, Tr. Vol. I, p. 94, LL. 1-2;
Vol. II, p. 285, LL. 5-9. All three companies are a part of the 50% book of business
owned by Nield, lnc. and Bret Kunz, Tr. Vol. I, p. 216, LL. 9-12. See also, Tr. Vol.
11, p. 285, LL. 10-12. All three companies require specific goals be met in order to
qualify for contingent commissions or profit sharing payments, Tr. Vol. I, p. 175, LL.
18-20, and are not guaranteed, Tr. Vol. I, p. 94, LL. 9-13. However, none of the
commissions that Bret is paid (even on a monthly basis) are guaranteed, being
contingent upon underwriting accepting a policy, contingent on the insured paying
the premium, or the insured not cancelling the policy and going with another
company, Tr. Vol. I, p. 94, LL. 14-25, p. 95, LL. 1-2. All three companies pay
contingent commissions or profit sharing payments annually and not monthly, Tr.
Vol. II, p. 272, LL. 2-4. All three companies issue the checks payable to Nield, Inc.
and not to Bret Kunz, Tr. Vol. I, p. 216, LL. 19-25. From this, somehow, the Court
concluded that Kunz is entitled to 50 percent of the Gem State profit sharing and not
one dime of the other companies.

The Respondent, Nield, Inc., specifically Bryan Nield, labeled all of the contingent
commission payments as "profit sharing", and only when the parties got to court did Nield Inc.
maintain that some of them were bonuses. R. 524, Fn. 28. The District Court's reasoning in
distinguishing Gem State from the other insurers is fatally flawed. The Court states that, "'The
language of Paragraph 7 in its 1996 Agent Contract is virtually identical to the 2009 contract." This
is true, but in 2009 Bret Kunz now became an owner of the Book of Business and not merely a
subproducer. This ownership interest is what Nield, Inc. maintains is the predicate basis upon which
profit sharing payments are to be paid, i.e. 50/50. Ex. 109, R. 28. The Court noted in Paragraph 36
of its Conclusions of Law, specifically reason 3, that, "B. Kunz freely admits under the 1996 "Agent
Contract" that its previous relationship with both M.0.Kunz and N.l., he did not receive and did not
expect to receive profit sharing as contingent bonuses." R. 523. However, B. Kunz didn't expect to
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receive them because Michael Kunz was receiving them, and this was to offset office overhead costs
to B. Kunz. Tr. Vol. I. p. 29, LL. 14-22. Bret Kunz wasn't saying he wasn't entitled to profit sharing
payments because the word "commission" didn't include them, he was saying he wasn't entitled to
profit sharing payments at all because they belonged to Michael Kunz, the owner of the Book of
Business. Bryan Nield must agree with that because his entire basis for the 50/50 commission split
of the Gem State profit sharing is based on the ownership of the Book of Business of the 2009
contract.
The Court reasoned in Paragraph 36 of its Conclusions of Law that "B.Kunz' own statement
that the purpose of entering into the 2009 [' ]Agent Contract(' ] was to create a ['JneVI., contract that
would include an ownership[' ] clause similar to the one contain in M.O.Kunz' [']Agent Contract[' ]
with N.I." R. 523. If the ownership clause doesn't also include a right to contingent commissions,
what good is it? Why would Bret Kunz want to be a co-owner of the Book of Business if it didn't
carry with it any compensation? 7 What' s the benefit of owning half of the Book of Business if you're
not entitled to the profit sharing or contingent commissions derived from the Book of Business?
What is it that Nield, Inc. has in ownership, and Bret Kunz doesn't have in ownership, that makes
Nield, Inc. entitled to the entire profit sharing commissions? This was never addressed by the District
Court in its reasoning. Bret is one owner of the Book of Business, yet the other owner get the entirety
of the profit sharing payments, irrespective of Bret's contribution or ownership. The District Court's

7

Paragraph 8 of the Agent Contract contains a right of first refusal in favor of Nield, Inc.
should Kunz desire to sell his interest (restricting Bret from selling), and an obligation for a
covenant not to compete, all restrictions on Bret Kunz. If ownership of the Book of Business
does not put Brnt Kun.£ on par wiLh Nield, Inc. to receive profit sharing or contingent

commissions, what value is it to Bret Kunz?
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reasoning negates the very purpose or benefit of the 2009 Contract, including an ownership clause.tM.O. Kunz had an ownership clause, and unquestionably received at least Gem State profit sharing
payments,!' although Bret Kunz maintained Michael received other profit sharing payments, as well.
While the District Court wasn't satisfied that Bret Kunz proved that other insurer profit sharing
payments were paid, Appellants maintain that isn't necessary to prevail in this case. So long as
Michael Kunz was receiving some profit sharing payments by virtue of his ownership iuterest, Bret
Kunz, who wanted a similar contract with Nield, Inc. as the one Michael had, is entitled to profit
sharing payments. The Court found, in weighing credibility of witnesses, that at the time of the
s igning of the contract Bryan Nield told Bret Kunz that, "we had some pretty good profit sharing
checks with Michael.., R. 519, 126 and Fn. 24.
The Court's conclusions that a distinction can be made between the entitlement to profit
s haring payments between Gem State and the other insurers is error of law. There is no basis in the
record upon which to predicate such a distinction, especially when the Court limited the parties'
analysis at the onset of trial to the preclus ion in implied contract theory.

V. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSTRUED THE CONTRACT AGAINST
THE DRAFTER.
Respondent argues that the issue of who the drafter of the contract is immaterial without
applying the rule of contra proferentem, then suggesting that this was not a contract of adhesion,

8

And again construes the Agent Contract in favor of the drafter despite its ambiguities.

')Actually, Thomas Nield acknowledged that not only did Michael Kunz receive profit
sh aring payments on Gem State, but Allstate as well, stating that, ·'J took 50 percent because
he- because I own 50 percent of his book. I sent the rest to him,'' Tr. Vol II, p. 396, virtually
acknowledging that profit sharing was tied to ownership of the Book of Business.
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inferring that the rule ofconstruction against the drafter only applies to adhesion contracts. The cases
cited in Kunzes' opening brief10 are not all adhesion contract cases. Appellants maintain that the rule
of construction against the drafter applies where, as here, there is little or no discussion reg'drding
the terms in question and not mere ly only to pure adhesion contracts. In fact, the Court specifically
stated:
The details of the [']Agent Contract[' ] and the language were not discussed. It was
obvious from the express language of the [·]Agent Contract[' ], the parties' course of
dealings and their trial testimony, that B.Kunz would receive 80 percent of the
commissions relative to policies sold (initial commissions) and 80 percent of
commissions associated with renewals with respect to his existing Book of Business
(residual commission). It was also obvious from the express language of the "Agent
Contract", the parties' course of dealing, and their trial testimony, that B.Kunz would
own 50% of his book of business and the N.I. would own the other 50%. However,
it is far from clear when one considers the express language of the parties' [']Agent
Contract['] (which the Court bas found to be ambiguous and unclear). the parties'
course of conduct, and their trial testimony, what their intent was concerning profit
sharing. R. 518. [emphasis added]
In such circumstances the Appellants believe the fallback rule applies and that it is error of
law not to apply the rule construing an ambiguous contract against the drafter.

VI. THE .JUDGMENT BELOW, AS WRITTEN, FAILED TO INCLUDE THAT KUNZ
PREVAILED AT LEAST IN PART ON THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.

10

See, e.g. Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 35: Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho
6, 9, 415 P.2d 48, 51 (1966), cited by the dissent in Simplot v. Bosen, supra at 757. See also,
Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Luna, 241 P.3d 945, 149 Idaho 772 (2010) (ambiguous grant deed
construed agai nst the drafter, citing C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 766, 25 P.3d 76, 79
(2001)); Madrid v. Roth, 10 P.3d 751, 134 Idaho 802 (Idaho App. 2000); Schilling v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 980 P.2d 1014, 132 Idaho 927 (1999); Suchan v. Suchan, 741 P.2d 1289, 113 Idaho 102
(1986) (the general rule that written documents, if ambiguous, should be construed against the
drafter, supra at 1295); Win of Michigan, Inc. v Yreka United, Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 751, 53 P.3d
330, 334 (2002) (construe the contract most strongly against the person who prepared the
contract). See also, Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 325, 246 P.3d
961, 978 (2010).
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Respondent argues that Kunz failed to raise below that the argument that the form of the
judgement finally entered was deficient, (although Kunz certainly was listed that issue in the Second
Amended Notice of Appeal. R. 750). Respondent is absolutely correct that in terms of Nield, Inc. 's
Motion to Alter or Amend, held post judgment, that Kunz took the position that the judgment not
be rewritten yet again for the fourth time 11 in light of the order conditionally dismissing the appeal.
R. 744. This does not mean the issue was not preserved, because it was considered by the Trial
Court. Given the difficulties in obtaining a form of the declaratory judgment that is satisfactory for
Rule 54(b) Certification and appeal, Kunzs' counsel took the conservative approach to leave well
enough alone since the third version of the judgment had apparently been accepted for appeal
purposes. 12
It would appear from the experience in this case that imposing strict restrictions under Rule
54(a) defeats the purpose of a declaratory judgment and that the fonn of this particular judgment
renders the judgment meaningless. LC. § 10-1201 provides as follows:

DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS AUTHORIZE- FORM AND EFFEL'T courts
of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights,
status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relieve is or could be claimed.
No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory

11

The original "Declaratory Judgment" was filed September 18, 2015, ( R. 565-67),
followed by a "Declaratory Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate" filed November 5, 20 15,( R.
687-690), both of which contain detailed rulings regarding the contact, but neither of which
addressed Kunzes' prevailing on a portion of the Declaratory Relief claims. A Notice of
Conditional Dismissal was filed December 8, 2015 ( R. 744), and the Court entered its
"Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate" on December 22. 2015 ( R. 760-62) from which this
appeal was taken.
12

In actual fact, Appellant never received any written documentation saying the conditions
to move forward on appeal had been satisfied, but merely a call from the clerk of the Supreme
Court that it was no longer necessary to file a response to the Order Conditionally Dismissing the
Appeal.
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - Page 18

judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or
negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the force and effect of
a final judgment or decree.
The judgment in this case reads, "JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Declaratory Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant Nield, Inc." R. 760. Only when one goes to
some other document, such as findings of fact and conclusions of law, can one discern what was
declared. The form of this judgment entered by the District Court, i.e. in favor of Defendant, is
meaningless and only partially accurate. ll was to that obscurity this counsel objected in KW1zes'
opening brief hoping that on remand and reversal clarification can be made by this Court as to the
scope of a declaratory judgment, as trial judge can enter and not run afoul of Rule 54(a). Courts have
long abhorred form over substance. See, e.g. In re Weick, 142 Idaho 275, 279, 127 P.3d 178 182
(2005) (This court will not exalt form over substance); Bone v. City ofLewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 849,
693 P.2d 1046, 1052 (1984); Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 777, 727 P.2d 1187, 1205 (1986);
Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 128 P.3d 948 (Ct.App. 2005); State v. Nunez, 138 Idaho 636, 639, 64

P.3d 831,834 (2003). Nevertheless, in this case it appear that unless the form of the judgment was
de minimis, Kunzes could not perfect their appeal. Accordingly, Kunzes did oppose amending the
judgment one more time, even though it left them stuck with a form of the judgment which is
inaccurate. Ordinarily, issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. DuVault, 131
Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998) citing to Sandpoint Convalescent Servs. Inc. v. Idaho

Dep 't ofHealth & Welfare, 114 Idaho 281,284, 756 P.2d 398,401 (1988). An exception lo this rule,
however, by this court when the issue was argued to or decided by the trial court, Northcut v. Sun

Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351, 356-57, 787 P.2d 1159, 1164-65 (1990); Du Vault, Supra.
In the present case, the issue was argued to the District Court, although the District Court
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declined to alter the judgment, likely for the same reasons that Kunzes' counsel did not want the
judgment altered at that time. However, it would be a travesty and a waste of judicial resources for
this Court not to clarify what may be written in a declaratory judgment and still not run afoul of Rule
54(a). This Court should make it clear that in the context of a declaratory judgment, the Court may
write more than simply judgment for the Plaintiff or judgment for the Defendant. Otherwise, J.C. §
10-1201 will be swallowed up by the strict interpretations of I.R.C.P. Rule 54(a).

VII. THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO DISMISS THE MATTER UNDER
I.R.C.P. RULE 4Hb).
I.R.C.P. Rule 41(b) provides:
Involuntary dismissal - Effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute
or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for
dismissal of an action or of any claim against the defendant. After the plaintiff, in an
action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of the
plaintiffs evidence, the defendant, without waiving the right to offer evidence in the
event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon
the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of
the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may
decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided
in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19,
operates as an adjudication upon the merits. [emphasis added]
The power to decline to render judgment at the close of the plaintiff's case is within the
discretion of the trial court; absent a clear abuse of that discretion the decision of the trial court will
not be overturned. Miller Constr. Co. v. Stresstek, 108 Idaho 187, 697 P.2d 1201 (Ct.App. 1985).
While the trial court's ultimate denial of the motion to dismiss is reviewable, the standard of review
on appeal from the judgment requires the review in court to view all of the plaintiff's evidence as
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being true and to afford every inference favorable to the plaintiff that may legitimately be drawn
from such evidence. Id.
Respondent argued that the District Court in this case erred because it believed a Rule 41(b)
Motion was inappropriate in the context of a declaratory judgment and that such was inapplicable
to declaratory relief actions. Whether or not the Court was right on this point, Respondent has not
shown by marshaling all of the evidence favorable to the Plaintiff that involuntary dismissal was
appropriate. In fact, had the matter stopped at the conclusion of the Plaintiffs' case, undoubtedly the
Court never could have ruled in favor of Nield, Inc. It is the Respondent's witnesses who cast any
doubt on what the course of dealing between the parties meant. 13
Nield, Inc. maintains that the Kunzes could not have received the relief requested because
the contract was unambiguous. Resp. Brief, p. 29. As previously argued, commission in its common
parlance would include contingent commissions, profit sharing, or even bonuses, so long as they
derive from the transactions of the Agent. Nield, Inc. assumes, without any authority, that
commission would always be read in its narrowest sense and that the term "other functions" based
on commission split would be meaningless. This is a matter this Court can freely review because the
decision as to whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. Swanson v. Beco Const.

Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.3d 748, 751 (2000), wherein the court stated:
"Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law over which we exercise
free review:" Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 132, 106 P.3d 465, 568 (2007).

13

lronically in this case much of the evidence submitted by Nield, Inc. was not found
credible, but the Court then concluded contrary to its own factual findings. Nevertheless, it could
hardly be argued that the Court below who struggled with the interpretation of the contract due to
the absence of specific negotiations between the parties, could somehow have issued findings
and a ruling on the spur of the moment at the close of Plaintiffs' case in chief. That is why the
Rule has an abuse of discretion standard and Nield, Inc. has not shown any abuse.
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Ambiguities can be either patent or latent. "Idaho courts look solely to the face of a
written agreement to determine whether it is [patently] ambiguous." Ward v. Puregro
Co., 128 Idaho 366, 369, 913 P.2d 582, 585 (1996). Accord, Valley Bank v.
Christensen, 119 Idaho 496, 808 P.2d 415 (1991). "A latent ambiguity is not evident
on the face of the instrument alone, but becomes apparent when applying the
instrument to the facts as they exist." In re Estate of Kirk, 127 Idaho 817,824, 907
P.2d 794, 801 (1995)...
To determine whether contract is patently ambiguous, a court looks at the face
of the document and gives the words or phrases used their established definitions in
common use or settled legal meanings. Pine Haven Planning Bd. v. Brooks, 138
Idaho 826, 70 P .3d 664 (2003). For a contract term to be ambiguous there must be
at least two reasonable interpretations of the term. Armstrong v. Farmer's Ins. Co.
ofldaho, 143 Idaho 135, 139 P.3d 737 (2006), or it must be nonsensical, Purdy v.
Farmer's Ins. Co. ofIdaho, 138 Idaho 443, 65 P.3d 184 (2003). Swanson, supra at
145 Idaho 62, 175 P.3d 751. 14

In this case Nield, Inc. asserts without a scintilla of support that the term commissions can
only refer to straight commissions paid on a monthly basis. They provide no definition from either
Webster's or Black's Law to support this nove l assertion. They provide no case law where the
meaning of the term "commission" has been definitely determined. This Court should find as a
matter of law that the contract is ambiguous, particularly when one adds in the "other function"
language of Paragraph 6 (which must also be predicated on commission split). If, as Nield, Inc.

14The

Court in this case used Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary of the English
Language to determine that the term "working day" had an established definition. Nowadays,
although not universally accepted, we tend to use Wikipedia. If you google the term
"commission" you will find numerous meanings, but when you focus on remuneration for
services rendered or products sold you'll immediately find that there are 2 common types of
commission. One is known as on-target earnings in which commission rates are based on the
achievement of specific targets that have been agreed upon between management and sales
person. The other is generally referred to as straight commission where there is no pay or salary
and is based totally on sales. While it notes that insurance broking is one of the common
industries that pays on commission, it fails to denote whether straight commission or on-target
commission is more common in the industry. On its face the term commission is ambiguous and
we cannot know whether Bret Kunz is entitled to on-target commissions, i.e. profit sharing, from
the plain language of the contract alone.
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asserts, Bret Kunz is limited to straight commissions for sales made does he also get residuals? He's
been paid residuals, but how would one know that from the face of the agreement? Nield, Inc.
maintains the word "commission" must be construed in its narrowest sense in the absence any
extrinsic evidence but provides no case law, no statute, no definition, or other common parlance to
support their perspective.
At the close of Plaintiffs case in chief aU that the Court had determine thus far was that the
contract was definitely ambiguous and the judge needed extrinsic evidence to help him ascertain the
parties' intent. There was no abuse of discretion and by applying the proper standard of review of
a Rule 41(b) Motion, this Court must give Kunzes the favorable inference that the term
"commission" and/or the "other function" language includes profit sharing or contingent commission
payments, thereby defeating any dismissal of Plaintiffs' case.

Vlll.

APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND

RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLE TO ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Nield, Inc. again puts the cart in front of the horse and assumes it's entitled to prevail without
proving same. It even goes so far as to accuse this counsel of filing a frivolous appeal. Nield, Inc's
arguments in this regard are wholly without merit and the analogy to the Jim and Maryann Plane

Family Trust v. Skinner, 157 Idaho 927,342 P.3d 639, 648 (2015) are absurd. In the Jim Plane case,
the District Court found that the trusts attempts to "selectively cut and paste from an otherwise clear
and unambiguous document" were frivolous. Id. at 342 P.3d 647. In this case, Judge Brown also
found the contract ambiguous. Is Nield, Inc. asserting that the Judge's finding is frivolous? The
Court below did not find the contract dear and unambiguous and Kw1zes' appeal predicated upon
the mis-application of the law is supported by both law and fact. It is supporlt:d by the facts as found
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by the Trial Court which directly contradict the conclusion the Court reached.
This appeal is well founded by virtue of the Judge's failure to use the course of dealing
evidence to ascertain the parties' intent of the contract, but contrarily using that evidence, or
explaining away that evidence under an implied contract theory, which even the Respondent
concedes was judicial error. Respondent cannot have its cake and eat it, too. Nield, Inc. cannot
maintain that the Court erred in the proceedings below and in its decision and simultaneously accuse
Kunzes of filing a frivolous appeal. If there is anything frivolous in this case it is their motion for
sanctions which is wholly untenable. Moreover, nowhere in its brief did Nield, Inc. respond directly
to issues raised by Kunzes in their opening brief. Specifically, Kunzes argued the fact that Bret
started receiving profit sharing payments in 2009 shortly after executing the subject Agent Contract
left the Court with no "course of dealing" that would justify the Trial Court finding that Gem State
payments were due to a course of conduct between the parties (because they commenced almost
immediately after signing the subject Agent Contract). Obviously, the new ownership clause that had
been added to the contractual relationship was the predicate upon which Bret Kunz started to receive
profit sharing payments. Nield, Inc. simply ducked this issue.
Kunzes argued in their principal brief that the lower Court's construction of the contract
rendered the "other functions" language meaningless, a matter contrary to sound contract
construction. Nield, Inc. never proposed a single, rational reason for that language or even a scintilla
of evidence from the record that would support what "other functions" based on commission split
could possible refer to. Obviously, the response to Kunzes' assertion is to show that the .Judge's
construction of the contract did not render one clause meaningless, something Nield, Inc. failed to
do.
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Nield, Inc.' s assertion that this unintegrated contract drafted entirely by Bryan Nield is wholly
unambiguous when viewed as a whole is contrary to the conclusions of the Court below and
undoubtedly will be contrary to the conclusions of the Supreme Court, as well. Even if one focuses
solely on the four corners of the document, there is simply no foundation for taking Nield, lnc.'s
perspective over Kunzes, as Bret's perspective is at least supported by the Black's Law definition
of the word "commission".
Though tempting, counsel for Kunzes will resist the urge to counter move for sanctions
against Nield, Inc. because it is simply conduct unbecoming. There are enough snakes crawling out
from under this case already for the Supreme Court to properly resolve.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons this Court should reverse the decision of the District Court and find
that the term "commissions" in common parlance would ordinarily include the contingent
commissions, absent some other meaning placed upon the word by the parties. Alternatively, that
the term "other functions" must certainly encompass profit sharing and contingent commissions.
That the parties' course of conduct as found by the District Court supports the interpretation that
profit sharing was a part of the 2009 Agent Contract and there was no side agreement or implied
agreement upon which profit sharing was predicated. Profit sharing started flowing to Bret Kunz
when he became a half owner of the Book of Business, and the declaratory judgment should be
entered declaring him to have the right to all contingent commissions, profit sharing payments or
bonuses that are predicated in whole or in part on his sales.
This Court should make it clear that as a one-half owner of the Book of Business Nield, Inc.
has no greater right to profit sharing payments arising out of their mutual sales than does Bret, except
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to the extent one party's sales are greater than the other's. Furthermore, the Court should specify that
the 80/20 split language governs commissions, not the 50/50 ownership language. The matter should
be reversed and remanded back Trial Court consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in this matter,
and attorney's fees should be awarded to the Appellants.
DATED THIS ~ a y of August, 2016.

?le~l/:0v:sVENAWUTHRICH
Attorney for the AppelJants

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF-Page 26

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on thisdfz day of August, 2016, I mailed two (2) true and exact bound
copies of the foregoing Appellants' Reply Brief to the following party(s):
Joseph T. Preston
ECHOHAWK IAW
P.O. Hox 6119
Pocatello, ID 83205-6119

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - Page 27

